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PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRAT!t 
I. Potential Gains from Unity 
There is widespread agreement that given the conditions of modern 
technology, regional economic integration would permit more rapid economic 
development using existing resources, markets, capital and labour. lt wou 
facilitate the task of reshaping the regional economy to end dependence on 
exports and the building of an integrated dorhestic · economy geared to 
increasing productivity and higher levels of living for the entire populat 
of the area.l · 
A. The Foundations of a Regional Development Strategy 
In particular, regional economic unification would permit the est4bli 
ment of optimum-sized pro~ucer goods industries and large-scale poles of 
growth with adequately planned linkages. This could set off a chain of 
growth leading to more rapid economic reconstruction and balanced internal 
development throughout the entire region. Increased production of certain 
essential industrial imputs could contribute significantly to expanded 
productivity in both industry and agriculture~ At the same time, the 
planned expansion of productive capacity and increase~ incomes in every 
part of the region could be expected to stimulate increased effective dema1 
for the growing ·industrial and agricultural output. 
A few selected examples2 may serve to indicate how regionally pl~pned 
economic development could accelerate industtf.al growth throughout th~ enJ:j 
area. Iron and steel products are essential for a wide range of constru~~d 
and industrial activities in a rapidly expanding economy. East Africa as ~ 
whole imported about Ll8.7 million worth of iron and steel products in 1961 
With the plans for rapid development, this was expected to ~xpancl at 8-11 
percent a year so that about 300,000 tons would be required by 1970. 
Although the diversity of steel products required would render it impossibl 
to produce all the final ~utput in one plant, an integrated iron apd steel 
project would produce the basic steel requiremepts. These could then be 
processed in a variety of smaller plants. 
There are two major potential sites for the establishment of an 
integrated iron and steel works in East Africa.* One is in U~anda where 
both high-grade ore and chqap hydro-electric power are available. The 
alternative, with the construction of the Tanzam rail link, is the developm 
of Tanzanian ore deposits using Tanzanian coal. In either case, the 
minimum-sized market for an optimum-sized iron and steel project would 
involve heavy capital investment and require the markets of all three 
countries. Along given present known technologies, neither the Tan~anian 
nor the Ugandan market could consume the potential output of the required 
large-scale plant. 
* A plant was established in Rhodesia when it was still a British colony; 
but it cannot be considered a feature of regional industrial development 
until that country is liberated. 
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Chemical ~ndustries, taken together, constitute another essential 
producer goods industry which could contribute to the acceleration of 
East African development. Such an industry could use local raw materials to 
end the expensive import of foreign fertilizers, permitting the more rapid 
spread of the use of fertilizers to augment agricultural output. Its esta~ 
blishment could constitute the first phase of the creation of a chemicals 
industry, an essential feature of modern industrial development. In the early 
1960' s, East Africa as a whole spent about 15 million to import chemi<;aL pro-
ducts , of which abput half was for agriculture including fertilizers and 
insecticides. An East African chemicals industry should eventually be 
diversified to produce dyestuffs for textiles; caustic soda and soda ash 
for glas~ production and soap manufacture; sulphuric acid; etc. The most 
important branch which should be initially constructed in East Africa would 
probably be an optimum-scale fertilizer plant. But the entire anticipated 
market in East Africa for basic fertilizer ingredients, nitrogen (N) and 
phosphates (P2o2) would, for the next decade, barely be adequate to support a project large enough to take full advantage of modern technology at 
relatively low costs per unit of output. 
Both Tanzftnia and Uganda have phosphates deposits which could ultimately 
be processed in an optimum-sized fertilizer i~dustry to meet the needs of the 
entire East African market . But the market of neither country, alone, is 
. adeq_uate to support such a project. 
N 
Table 10-1 
East African Anticipated Consumption of Basic Fertilizer Ingredients: 
1970, 1980 in Tons 
1964 1970 1980 
14,800 28,200 74,800 
13,200 28,600 60,400 
Sources: Calculated from E. J. Stoutjesdijk, EDRP No. 96, "Prospective 
Demand for Manufac~ures in East Africa - A Survey," 5/~/66, 
pp. 23-24 (based on E/CN.14/$LR/88.). 
In later stages, the coal deposits of Tanzania are suitable for con-
struction of a coal distillation industry as a potential basis for a 
chemicals complex producing coal tar and eventually drugs, dyes, pharma-
ceuticals and plastics. Kenya's forest reserve would make it a natural area 
for development of a wood distillation complex to supply East Africa with gas, 
· acetone, acetone acid, methanol and tar. These industries, too, would require 
major capital investments and regional markets; none of them could be realized 
by any of the individual countries alone. 
Other industries, whose location is less dependent on raw materials 
than on markets, sources of power, and the costs of transporting the final 
products, include engineering industries and textiles, Given the formulation 
and implementation of a region-wide plan to locate industries, the relative 
i 
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flexibility possible in determining the location of these industries should 
permit the establishment in each country, and even each major area within 
each country, of a pole of growth of sufficient size to set off a significant 
chain of development. 
Engineering industries form a highly complex group producing a large 
variety of goods from bicycles and tractors to lorries. The minimum efficient 
size is usually large. In the early stages manufacture may be limited to 
last stage assembly of components for a limited market. A large market as 
w~ll as more capital is required in later stages of development to produce 
the components. Related industties should be planned simultaneously to 
establish a joint demand for such components as well as to provide adequate 
repairs and servicing. Together, these could create the linkages necessary 
to make construction of more technically advanced engineering industries 
viable. 
In East Africa as a whole, a considerable range of mechanical and 
electrical activities would be feasible. Tractors, initially probably 
excluding the engines, add bicycles could be economically produced. The 
establishment of a steel industry would facilitate the local production of 
component parts. Standardization of part1s for tractors, bicy¢les and lorries 
would permit establishment of units to produce components; this implies that 
the present import of widely differing types of tractors and other mechanical 
equipment should cease, since they require differing components and heoce 
limit the standardization required to establish local production units.* 
Cotton textiles may be produced on a relatively smail-scale from raw 
cotton through spinning, weaving and finishing. The best possible use of 
regional resources suggests that such industries should be established as 
poles of growth in areas where resources may not be available for other kinds 
of industries. In other words, the location of textile industries should be 
planned within the framework of an overall plan for industrial allocation, to 
ensure that all areas participate in growth of productivity, employment and 
incomes. 
Industries producing cement, which constitutes a major cost element in 
many construction projects, need to be located near the necessary raw materials, 
especially limestone, as well as the markets for the final products, since 
transport costs are heavy both before and after processing. Japanese 
experience sujgests that such plants may work efficiently at about a 50,000 
ton capacity. Hence they may be established on a relatively small-scale qear 
appropriate natural resources to facilitate low-cost construction of devel-
opment projects in separate areas. Construction of cement plants should be 
planned to facilitate building programs designed to fulfil the requirements 
of the overall regional plan. Their construction may in effect contribute to 
creation of demand for their output in the sense that, once they are built, 
projects using cement may become economical where they might otherwise never 
have come into existence. 
* This clearly has implications for purchasing and import policies, an 
important reason for co-ordinati~g the national import policies of the 
three countries. 
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Production .· of flat glass on an optimum-scale is estimated to require a 
plant size of about a six million ton capacity. The estimated domestic con-
sumption of glassware in all three East African countries in 1963 was less 
than 15 thousand tons, although it was expected to increase to 22,000 tons 
in 1970 and 27,000 in 1979. In other words, the entire East African market 
could barely support an optimal-sized modern flat glass plant; if possible, 
it would be preferable to establish one for a much larger region including 
other neighboring countries. 
The Economic Commission for Africa recommended that a la~ge'-'sca'le glass 
plant should be built in Mombasa or Dar es Salaam, since both Kenya and 
Tanzania have most of the necessary raw materials. Sand, soda, ash, lime 
felspar, and dolomite are required to make glass. Of these, sand is the 
most important. Dar es Salaam's sand is not of as high a grade as Kenya's 
and Tanzania would have to import dolomite and soda ash. While all the 
ingredients are available in Kenya, they are scattered in various parts of 
the · country. Location of the plant at a port would facilitate imports of 
additional materials lt!equired as well as the export of any surplus · production. 
A long list of possible industries might be incorporated into an East 
African development plan. The region as a whole has adequate natural 
resources, markets, capital and labour to initiate industrial expansion on a 
fairly broad front. Smaller, more labour-intensive projects could be linked 
into an overall plan which provided for larger pole of growth factories. The 
key element in such a plan would be to ensure that, following detailed 
feasibility studies, each area of the re'gion benefitted from the creation of 
an adequate industrial sector to enable it to participate fully in 
integrated region-wide growth. 
Expanding agricultural production should also be planned to support 
industrial development within an increasingly integrated Eas~ African economy. 
The linkages between proposed industries and agriculture should be planned to 
ensure that: (1) adequate agricultural raw materials would be available for 
new industries as they were established; (2) the supplies of food would be 
adequate for the growing regional urban labour force; 0) a sufficient share 
of regional surpluses would be invested in critical industrial projects; 
(4) the cash incomes of farmers throughout the region would expand steadily 
to provide a market for the increased output of consumer goods and farm 
inputs produced by the regional manufacturing sector; and (5) ultimately -
as regional industrial sectors grew - agricultural labour would be released 
to work in the new factories. 
Once the planned pattern of investments, particularly in crucial 
industries located throughout the region, had been agreed upon, the 
Governments would need to enforce appropriate institutional controls over 
investment - domestic and foreign - to ensure that the plan was carried out. 
No longer could the Governments vie with one another in creating "an · 
hospitable investment climate" to the extent of: trying to attract private 
investors - mainly foreign - without regard to the regional plan.4 The 
Governments themselves would need to agree to invest sufficient amounts of 
capital - regardless of decisions by foreign investors - to ensure that the 
plans would in fact be implemented. Joint public control of pole of growth 
industries would be essential. 
5 
In reality such an approach would simply be broadening the specialization 
and exchange :required for industrialization from the level of each country 
to the regional level; but on the regional level, the potential for benefit-
ting from the larger regional markets, accumulations of capital and skilled 
manpower would be far greater than on a national level. 
B. The Necessity of Altering Regional Trading and Financial Institutions . 
Within the framework of the regional plan, the entire pattern of trade 
would need to be shifted to support expanding regional industry and 
agriculture. No longer could the inherited institutional pattern be permitted 
to direct trade through the export enclaves centred predominantly on Nairobi.5 
The three states would need to co-ordinate their efforts to create new trading 
ins~itutions to ensure that trading links between them expanded in a manner 
calculated to contribute to balanced industria l and agricultural development. 
The pattern of export-import trade·rwould need to be fundamentally shifted. 
The import of luxury items should be reduced sharply releasing foreign exchange 
to permit the expansion of the import of capital goods and equipment to build 
pole of growth industries and associated projects throughout the region. 
Exports should be planned on a regional basis to avoid competitive overprQduc-
tion in relation to slowly growing world demand; and should be increasingly 
processed in regional factories to raise their unit value. In the case of 
such exports as lumber, paper pulp from sisal, and cement, a growing share of 
the output might be used to meet domestic needs. Expansion of exports could 
be facilitated by long-term contracts with foreign buyers linking imports 
of capital goods and equipment to specific exports; this would undoubtedly 
necessitate governmental action to shift import patterns from tradi~ional 
suppliers. 
This shift in the pattern of export-import trade could not simply be 
left to the market forces operating in the prevailing dual economies of the 
region. The entire institutional . structure shaped in the colonial era to meet. 
the needs of the large foreign trading firms would need to be altered. The 
participating governments would need to obtain a sufficient degree of control 
over export-import trade to direct it along the lines appropriate to the 
growth of the regional plan. The pattern of internal trade, too, would need 
to be altered to contribute effectively to regional integration. Joint 
internal trading institutions, particularly at the wholesale level, would be 
necessa~y to ensure that internal markets expanded throughout the region for 
newly built industries, regardless of in which country they were located. 
This is particularly true because no East African state could afford to 
invest its own funds in an optimal-sized project based on the assumption that 
it would benefit from regional markets unless it had some form of guarsntee 
that the markets would be in fact be available. This would require a high 
level of agreement among participating states to ensure that industries, once 
established, could sell a planned portion of their output in the region. State 
control of importing firms would, again, need to be suf~icient to ensure that 
such agreements were not undermined by the import of competing products into 
any of the three nations. 
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The implementation of a regional plan, like that of the plan in any given 
country, requires sufficient changes in the inherited complex of monetary and 
financial institutions to ensure that investible surpluses are retained and 
directed towards building the poles of growth and essential linkages as well 
as financing the new trading pattern. This could not be lef'.t ' to chance, since 
the implementation of any part of the regional plan depends on the implementa-
tion of the whole plan. No one state could give up the opportunity to invest 
in its own industry, even on a basis less advantageous than for a regional 
market, unless it could be assured that the major investment decisions of 
all three states would be directed ta implementation of the regional plan for 
regional specialization and exchange. Sufficient joint control of commercial 
banks, insutance firms and financing houses would need to be attained to end 
the inherited pattern of the outflow of investible surpluses.6 Foreign 
exchange would need to be consciously directed to purchase of essential 
capital goods and equipment. Governmental agreement concerning foreign 
investments would be essential to ensure that such funds contributed to 
projects meeting the requirements of the regional plan. The three governments 
would need to agree, too, on a region-wide incomes policy and tax program' 
which would end the inherited distorted pattern of income distribution.7 
Agreed tax and government salary schedules would need to be formulated to 
direct surpluses formerly accumulated by high income groups to creation of 
essential new productive facilities designed to meet the needs of the entire 
regional population. 
In sum, if the East African countries are to accelerate their pace of 
development through regional co-operation, they must achieve a suffic~ent 
level of control of critical regional institutions to plan and carry out a 
region-wide strategy of industrial and agricultural growth. They will need 
to agree on the appropriate institutional changes which will be required to 
shift the inherited patterns of partially separated dual economies to a 
regionally-integrated economy capable of achieving increased specialization 
and exchange designed to raise leuels of productivity and living standards 
throughout. This will require adequate institutional control over decision-
making in industry and agriculture to ensure that the development strategy 
is implemented. It will require sufficient institutional control over trade -
especially wholesale trade - to ensure that regional markets are expanded 
along with the growth of industrial and agricultural output. It will 
necessitate major alterations in the monetary and financial institutions to 
ensure that investible surpluses produced are not drained out of the country 
or captured by a domestic elite, but are, inatead; directed to implementation 
of the overall plan. · 
II. Obstacles to East African Economic Integration 
Despite ~xtensive agreement as to the potential advantages of East 
African economic integration, present political-economic realities indicate 
significant obstacles to their attainment. The plans of the separate countries 
are drawn up separately with little or no consultation. 8 Each group of 
national planners concentrates on immediate possibilities in their own 
country for domestic development. In some instances these ~re quite contrary 
to those which{·.might be realized by broader co-operation. Even more important, 
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many critical investment decisions, which would be essential to attain the ,. 
goals of regional economic integration, are left to private interests - domestic 
and foreign - primarily directed to capturing short-term gains. As a result 
major investments are still made to take advantage of the existing inherited 
market patterns, determined by past export enclave expansion, rather than 
contributing to essential economic reconstruction. The underlying difficulty 
appears to be the 3:ack of political agreement, backed by essential institu-
tional changes, to attain overall regional development directed to raising 
productivity and levels of living throughout the entire region. 
A. Lack of Substantial Agreement 
The Kampala Agreement for regional industrial allocation9 was reached at 
a meetin,g of Ministers in Kampala in April, 1964, modified . in subsequent 
meetings, and confirmed by the Heads of Government at Mbale on 14 January, 
1965 for embodiment in a formal legal convention. The Agreement outlined 
measures to protect the development position of the less developed .East 
African countries, particularly in relation to the large privately~owned 
firms manufacturing tobacco, footwear, qeer and cement; arrangements with 
these private firms were reported to have contributed to specific actions by 
private firms which would reduce Tanganyika's 1963 net trade imbalance with 
Kenya by 24 per cent (Ll.8 million). Similar efforts with regard to cigar-
ettes, shoes and beer~'<- were expected to reduce the Ugandan 1963 net trade 
imbalance with Kenya by 23 per cent (L650,000). 
In the area of allocation of new industries, the agreement proposed 
a rather ad hoc list with relatively little attention given to determtning 
even the ~st""°appropriate kinds of industries to establish, far less the · 
possibility of establishing poles of growth and associated backward and 
forward linkages. 
1. Tanzania was to be allocated a monopoly of production of 
plain aluminium sheets, circles and foil; 
2. Uganda wa:s to have sole rights to manufacture biq'5cles 
and assembly firms elsewhere would have to buy from Uganda 
those parts manufactured in Uganda; 
3. Kenya was to have exclusive rights to manufacture electric 
light bulbs, and might apply for scheduling neon and flour-
escent tubes as well; 
4. Tanzania was to have exclusive rights in radio assembly 
and manufacture and existing assembly firms would 
purchase from Tanzania parts manufactured there; 
* Several breweries were involved in Kenya's trade with Uganda, and 
separately owned breweries existed in Uganda, so the quota system was to be 
applied, rather than utilizing direct contacts with the companies; in the 
case of cement no direct action could be taken with the companies because 
there were no ties between them, but quotas would probably be established 
since both countries were expected to have surplus capacity after Tanzania's 
plant was built,:'. 
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5. Uganda was to have exclusive rights for manufacture 
of nitrogenous fertilizers; 
6. Tanzania was to have exclusive rights to manufacture 
motor vehicle tires and tubes. 
A quota system was to be established to limit export from surplus 
·countries to deficit countries. This was not expect.ced to be a permanent 
feature of the East African Common Market but only to redress temporarily 
trade imbalances. Other industries which could only be feasible if they had 
access to the entire East African market were to be ~llocated by a panel of 
industrial experts on the basis of the need for an equitable distribution of 
industry throughout the region. The panel would also consider the appropriate 
system of industrial incentives. 
The Kenya delegation declared that its acceptance of the recorrnnendations 
was subject to certain assumption~, including the establishment of a corrnnon 
currency. · Tanzania's delegation rejected the inclusion of these assumptions 
in the Report because some were outside the terms of reference of the Com-
mittee considering the Report had not been discussed. Whether the Kampala 
Agreement would have provided a sufficient degree of joint control to attain 
regional planning and more development was never tested. Ultimately, the 
Kampala Agreement was not accepted by the Kenya Government. 
The Treaty for East African Co-operation which created the present East 
African Corrnnunity, came into effect at the end of 1967 after further nego-
tiations. The joint activity carried on during the next year and a half, 
however, was not really sufficient to set in train effective planned 
regional reconstruction. Actions taken were essentially limited to the 
co-ordincfring of programs for research and extension of existing regional 
infrastructural facilities.10 
The Economic Consultative and Planning Council met a few times in an 
effort to define its advisory role in relation to long.term planning. It had 
no power to ensure implementation of its proposals by any of the national 
plan authorities. The planners in Kenya and Tanzania formulated the next 
round of national plans with little or no serious consultation about overall 
strategy, far less about specific projects. 
The establishment by the Research and Social O~uncil of a Working Party 
to investigate research priorities might be expected to contribute to 
adaptation of modern technologies to African agricultural and industrial 
requirements. It could not, of itself, ensure the necessary plan co-or~ination 
to incorporate the results of such research into actual productive capacity in 
the region. The Connnunications Council met several times. Plans for the 
extension of railways, harbours and telecommunications facilities were agreed 
upon. The Boards of the autonomous parastatals responsible for carrying out 
these broad plans were to arrange essential financing. In any event, however, 
such plans were confined to providing infrastructure to meet the needs of 
existing productive capacity; it could not be .expected to ensure the creation 
of new productive capacity required to restructure the regional economy. 
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The Connnon Market Council met several times primarily to deal with the 
operation of the Transfer Tax. It managed to resolve most disagreements 
satisfactorily; only one issue was referred to the Common Market Tribunal. 
Agreement to permit individual Connnon Market members to establish .transfer 
taxes appeared unlikely, however, to do much to alter the prevailing trends 
towards autarky. It might be expected, on the contrary, to accelerate such 
trends since the transfer taxes were essentially designed to protect projects 
established by less developed partners in competition with existing ones in 
more developed countries. 
One observer connnented11 that the transfer ta:xies are "more likely to 
preserve the existing balance than to improve it by encouraging completely 
new industries to come to East Africa." In some industries small scale 
plants protected by transfer taxes might not necessarily be inefficien~ and, 
it might be argue~ could contribute to competition. Nevertheless, the fact 
that manlf. of such processing plants are subsidiaries of large firms which, 
given completely "free trade," would have a monopoly of the East African 
market renders "an argument based on competition meaningless." This 
observer concluded that, in the last analysis, "the really staggering fault 
of these measures is that ••• the implementation of them is left to the 
individual countries ••. As things stand, it seems likely that the connnunity 
and its various organs will be reduced to making general statements on the 
need for unity while the decisions which actually determine the extent of 
unity will be made by three separate governments whose primary responsibility 
is national and not regional." 
Another economist argued12 that, given the possible alternatives of 
either erecting its own tariff barriers or continuing its quantitative 
restrictions on Kenyan goods, "Tanzania does seem to hlre been hannnered down 
in the bargaining to the point oraclose to the point at which membership 
would have been a matter of indifference to it." Kenya and Uganda derived 
positive gains in so far as maintenance of the connnon market was essential 
to their existing industries, so that "Tanzania has certainly made great 
sacrifices relative to the other two members for the achievement" of the 
"higher objectives of East African Unity." 
The East African Development Bank was established as a major new insti-
tution designed to contribute to the stated objective of providing finance and 
technical assistance to promote industrial development within~: the Connnunity .13 
By May 1969 the Bank had approved six projects totalling about Ll.2 million.14 
Two kinds of proposals dominated t!Ie ·.initial requests for finance: 
(1) import substitution projects which, the .Bank declared, 15 might raise costs 
to the national economies since they generally . required quota or tariff 
protection permitting establishment of near-monopoly conditions "perhaps with-
out adequate controls;" and (2) export processing projects directed towards 
overseas markets. 
The Bank announced16 its intention of trying in the future to identify 
industries and praj.ects which could accelerate the overall growth of the 
Community's industrial sector, making possible reduction of existing 
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imbalances between Partner States in the context of a high industrial 
growth rate for the entire Connnunity. In this respect, however, the 
effectiveness of Bank action was likely to be limited by the lack of co-
ordination and effective implementation of the plans of the three member 
Governments. Major projects can not be financed in any one of the three 
countries unless the -' other two agree to purchase an adequate share of their 
output to ensure their continuing viability - which implies that the other 
two must agree not to pei"'lllit construction of competing ventures (whether by 
government or private investors) in their territories. Hence the effective• 
ness of the Bank in attaining its stated goals appeared to depend essentially 
on the co-ordination of the national plans backed by a sufficient degree of 
joint government control of key institutions to ensure their implementation 
in critical respects. 
B. Lack of Co-ordinated Planning 
The actual degree of co-ordinated planning and institutional changes 
among the three East African Governments has, however, remained inadequate 
to carry out a program designed to co~tribute effectively to restructuring 
the economy of the region. Uncertain as to the possibilities of obtaining 
either the markets or capital needed to build optimum-scale producer goods 
industries for regional domestic markets, the planners of each country have 
tended to emphasize import substitution industries, frequently using imported 
materials and parts as well as capital goods.17 Not infrequently, such 
projects have been established in more than one of the three countries in 
competition with those already existing in another. Overseas exports of 
manufactured goods, though desired by all three, are limited by relatively 
high production and sea transport costs in some cases (very high in Uganda's 
case because of the long haul to the sea). In addition, many o f the 
developed countries maintain tariff bf Briers against the import of goods 
manufactured in developing countries. 
The history of the tobacco industry provides an early example of the 
way the ·expansion of output in two East African countries reduced the pos-
sibility of expansion of existing capacit~ in a third. Establishment of 
cigarette plants in Kenya and Tanzania clearly reduced Ugandan exp~9ts to 
those countries and led to an initial reduction of Ugandan output. 
In the cement industry, Kenya's exports to Tanzania were replaced by 
Tanzanian production; and Kenya's cement producers, confronted by a slump 
in domestic consumption, raised domestic prices to subsidize exports over-
seas. 20 
More recently, all three countries have expanded textile output, 
although none made exact location calculations in terms of their contribution 
to national, far less to regional, planned economic growth.21 Initially 
Uganda sold a considerable share of its textile output to Kenya and Tanzania, 
but as those countries expanded their output, this possibility was reduced. 
Uganda has rec~ntly begun to report surplus textiles stocks.22 At the same 
time, East African production costs are reported to be 20-25 per cent higher 
than cif prices of fabrics imported from Japan, Hong Kong, India, China and 
-· 
" 
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Pakistan, so that the onl2 probabl~ export market would be to neighbours in 
an African conrrnon market. 3 Kenya's proposed production of rayon and poplin 
materials may increase dependence on imported new and semi~processed materials 
contributing to the reduction of integrated East African development. 
The rapid expansion of sugar production throughout East Africa in the 
post-independence era, initially stimulated by rising wotld prices, approx-
imately doubled sugar output in the region, and is beginning to produce a 
surplus. In all three countries, government intervention has involved 
relatively heavy investments as well as regulation of prices and distribution; 
but prices have not been set at the lowest possible competitive point, nor 
pas each government even pursued an independent policy in r2~ation to sugar 
'production within the framework of national economic goals. The high 
prices of East African sugar are likely to limit export potential so that 
whatever surplus is produced will need to be absorbed in Africa itself at the 
expense of the local consumers; otherwise excess capacity in the sugar 
industry, too, may be expected to lie idle. 
On the other hand, establishment of producer goods industries, which 
requ.ire the entire regional market to become viable, app~ars likely to 
lag or even be postponed indefinitely, In some cases the separate govern-
ments are making decisions which may actually hamper their ultimate establish-
ment. Uganda's small~sized steel scrap rolling mill appears liRely to be 
duplicated by a 30,000 ton project in Tanzania and another similar project 
in Kenya. Both will be based, not on East African ores, but on imported 
scrap.~5 Uganda's Tororo fertilizer plant which requres the entire East 
African market for proposed expansions, was to be duplicated by a plant in 
Kenya but it was postponed due to lack of market. Tanzapia is planning 
another, again based initially, not on domestic phosphate deposits, but 
imported materials.26 It has been held that the present markets of Kenya's 
oil refinery in Mombasa, and Tanzania's in Dar es Salaam are both too small 
to justify the expensive installation of equipment to produce lubricating 
oils and greases. Those installations would require a minimum capacity of 
75,000 tons a year, while the estimated 1975 regional consumption of these 
items will be only 38,500 ~ons.27 Nevertheless, Kenya now appears prepared 
to encourage investment of about KL8 million in such a project in hopes of 
finding alternative markets in Africa.&8 
In the case of rubber tires Tanzania's N~tional Development Corporation 
co.ntracted with a U.S. firm, General Tire Corporation, to build a plant 
(80 per cent financed by NDC) using imported materials with the stated 
aim of producing enough tires to meet the entire East African demand. This 
would have been in accord with the earlier Kampala discussions. Within a 
year of this announcement, however, another U.S. firm declared, and this was 
canfirmed in Kenya's 1970-74 plan, that it had Kenyan government permission to 
invest L5.~ million in a similar plant with expectations of exporting a 
significant share of its output.29 If both investments are in fact made, 
it is evident that over-capacity is likely to result; and in Tanzania's case 
this could result in significant losses of scarce government investment funds :. 
Another consequence of the failure to attain plan co-ordination was the 
continued competitive emphasis on agricultural expansion for export. All 
three countries, seeking to earn enough foreign exchange to buy needed capital 
12 
equipmentA planned expansion of tea, coffee, potton, pyrethrum, and 
tobacco.3u The potential expansion of these exports is limited by slowly 
growing world demand, as well as the rapid expansion of output by competitors 
in other parts of the developing world. Great care must be exercised to 
avoid further over-production in r e lation to the relatively inelastic 
demand in world markets.31 This consideration appeared to urge major efforts 
to plan expansion of regional agricultural exports jointly in conjunction with 
regional plans to build processing industties {especially since such 
industries may need to be capital-intensive to compete with other world 
producers). It also underlined the importance of joint efforts of East African 
countries, together with other dev¢loping nations, to arrive at suitable 
producer quotas and reasonable prices for major agricultural exports in order 
to acquire foreign exchange earnings for their industrial growth. 
On the other hand, East African efforts to reduce imports have been 
directed to attainment of self-sufficiency in food production, not infre-
quently by limiting imports from East African neighbors. Kenya's maize 
price and production policies have in the past been criticised as being 
conducive to keeping relatively high priced larger Highlands farms in business, 
mile hindering sales of lower cost maize from neighboring states. Ope critic 
of Kenya's . self-sufficiency maize policy added32 that it 
results in a misallocation of resources within Kenya 
itself, but has got rep~rcussions on the efficient 
allocation of resources in neighboring countries, and 
to a certain degree intensified their trade imbalance 
with Kenya, thus for c ing them to retaliate • ••• these 
countries import a lot of animal products and manufactured 
goods from Kenya in which Kenya has comparative cost 
advantage, but they find that they are not allowed to expand 
their maize exports to Kenya in which they too possibly have 
a similar advantage. 
Kenya's 1970-1974 plan to expand maize exports appeared premised on the 
assumption of the possibility of reduced costs; but, nevertheless, it appeared 
likely to conflict with Tanzanian:·.and perhaps Ugandan efforts to produce 
sufficient maize at least to meet their own needs.33 Furthermore, Tanzania 
and Uganda had both begun to expand dairy production to reduce imports from 
Kenya. Tanzania has been expending funds to encourage domestic wheat 
production to reduce Kenyan imports. Local sugar and tobacco production in 
Kenya and Tanzania has had the effect of reducing Ugandan sales in these 
countries. 
C. Lack of Agreement Concerning Needed Institutional Changes 
At bottom the problem seemed to rest, not merely on the fact that each 
country was now taking steps essentially based on a policy of going it alone, 
but on the underlying political-economic reality. The three Governments 
have not achieved a sufficient degree of political unification to ensure that 
plans for economic reconstnuction could even be formulated, far less that 
they could be effectively implemented. 
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East African experience since independence suggests that, unless the 
inherited institutional structure in each country was fundamentally altered, 
ecpnomic ·reconstruction throughout the region was unlikely to take place. 
The mass of available evidence suggested that private decision makers - the 
largest of them still foreign firms - were likely to make investments, if at 
all, which would of necessity be oriented towards existing markets. As a 
result, such investments were likely to extend existing export enclaves. 
For the most part, they tended to be in expanded agricultural produce for 
export, sometimes accompanied by simple processing; and limited maufacture 
of consumer goods - mainly luxuries and a few widely used necessities. 
Mostly the latter tended to be located in existing export enclaves, especially 
at Mo~basa and. Nairobi in Kenya, where there exist external economies and 
concentrations of higher income groups. 34 Pri,vate African entrepreneurs 
usually lacked the know-how and funds to invest in projects to contribute 
significantly to economic reconstruction. For the most part, they tended to 
invest in trade and speculative real estate. A few became associated 
directly with large foreign firms as minor shareholders or lower level 
managers. Such investments contributed little to the essential restructuring 
of the economy.35 
Each of the Governments of the East African countries, confronted with 
these realities, pursued different approaches. Initially, they all sought 
to attract foreign capital and know-how through tax incentives, import duty 
reduction, and similar devices. No significant changes appeared to be 
taking place in the structure of the economies. 
After several years, the Tanzania Government, in accord with the new 
approach formulated in the Arusha Declaration, intervened more directly to 
change the structure d.f key institutions. Nevertheless, Tanzania's efforts 
could not be expected to alter the fundamental factors contributing to 
private decisions to concentrate investment in the limited developed sectors 
of Kenya and, to a lesser extent in Uganda; under the circumstances, Tanzania 
could only hope to plan reconstruction in a manner cal'culated to lessen its 
own dependence on exports, increasing productivity and living standards 
throughout its own economy. 
Inevitably, this implied that Tanzania's growth potential would be 
somewhat slower than would have been possible given full East African 
Community co-operation to plan for establishment of large-scale industrial 
projects capable of setting off more rapid chains of development.36 Unable 
to rely on regional allocation of industries based on available resources to 
ensure an optimal pattern of development, Tanzania appeared to have little 
choice but to rely on its efforts to reconstruct its economy unilaterally. 
As a min,imum, it appeared essential to avoid acceptance of connnon market 
policies which would undermine these effo'.tts. 
The possibility of greater co-operation between Uganda and Tanzania 
emerged in 1970 when Uganda's President announced that his Government sought 
to attain greater control of the connnanding heights of his country, especially 
banks, export import trade and basic industries. If the two countries could 
begin to link their development strategies more closely, backing them with 
sufficient agreed-upon institutional control to implement joint plans once 
14 
fonnulated, it became possible that together they could accelerate their 
efforts to restructure their economies.* This possibility was somewhat 
reinforced by the improvement of Tanzania's infrastructure potentially 
opening more direct trade channels with Uganda. How Kenya might be 
expected to react in the e"ll'ent that its neighbors began to move in this 
direction remained unclear. 
III. Summary 
East African experience since , independence sug·gest;; that, unless the 
inherited institutional pattern could be fundamentally altered, efforts to 
stimulate development of an integrated regional economy would be doomed 
to frustration. The existing institutional complex was founded upon and 
reinforced the dual economies shaped in the colonial era. 
Analysis of post-independence efforts to achieve development in East 
Africa suggests that, to the extent that the institutional str~cture is left 
unaltered, the dual economies are likely to persist. Export enclave expansion 
is unlikely to contribute significantly to increased productivity either 
throughout individual countries or throughout the region. The elites, who 
stepped into the place of the departing colonial administrators, might 
temporarily benefit from the high incomes generated by maintenance of the 
status guo. But, as world market prices fall due to oversupply in relation 
to limited demand, stagnation and unrest are likely to spread. 
The crucial need, on the regional as well as the national level, is to 
determine what kinds of institutional changes must be made in the key areas -
basic industry, export-import and internal trade, and money and finance -
to attain integrated economic development capable of increasing 
productivity throughout in order to attain higher levels of living for all 
inhabitants. 
* It could not be altogether ruled out, either, that the opening of the 
Tanzam road and railroad would provide for greater independence of action 
by ~ambia which might then conceivably participate in developing a regional 
strategy with Uganda and Tanzania. 
i 
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